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The Federal Arbitration Act Preempts a State Law
that Renders Unconscionable a Class Arbitration
Waiver in a Consumer Adhesion Contract Likely to
Involve Disputes over Small Sums of Money: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION-CONTRACTS-
ARBITRATION-UNCONSCIONABILITY-The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
preempts California's law that a class arbitration waiver is uncon-
scionable if it is found in a consumer adhesion contract wherein
disputes are likely to involve small amounts of damages and
where the party of inferior bargaining power has alleged the de-
frauding of many customers out of small sums of money, because
such a law conflicts with the purposes and objectives of the FAA.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
I. THE FACTS OFAT&TMOBILITY ................................... 920
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AT&T MOBILITY ........ 921
III. AT&T MOBILITY AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT .......................................................... 922
A. Issue and Holding on Certiorari ...................... 922
B. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion .................... 922
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion ............ 926
D. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion ................ 929
IV. THE HISTORICAL NEXUS OF
ARBITRATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, AND
THE CLASS M ECHANISM ............................................... 932
A. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp ........................................... 933
B. Discover Bank v. Superior Court ..................... 935
C. The Circuit Split Embodied in the
Decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits ...... 938
V. How JUSTICE SCALIA DEFTLY PREVENTS A PER
SE UNCONSCIONABILITY THREAT TO THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, AN EXAMINATION OF
AT&T MOBILITY VIA TWO ALTERNATIVE METHODS
OF ANALYSIS, AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS ............ 940
919
Duquesne Law Review
A. The AT&T-Concepcion Arbitration Clause ...... 942
B. Discover Bank-Unconscionability Per Se? .... 944
C. What's "Leff" to Discuss? .................. ................ 944
D. Did the Concepcions Assume the Risk
of a Class Arbitration Waiver? ......................... 945
E. What the Future Holds ..................................... 948
I. THE FACTS OFAT&TMOBILITY
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1  addresses the
unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer adhe-
sion contracts. Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into a cellu-
lar telephone contract with AT&T Mobility LCC ("AT&T") in
2002.2 Their contract provided for arbitration of all disputes.3
However, the contract required that the Concepcions bring any
claims in their individual capacity.4 Class-wide arbitration was
forbidden.5 The contract also permitted AT&T to unilaterally
amend the agreement-and the company did make several such
amendments to the arbitration clause.6 The controlling revised
agreement of 2006 required that customers initiate a claim by
completing a Notice of Dispute form.7 If their claim was not re-
solved within thirty days, customers could seek arbitration by fil-
ing a Demand for Arbitration.' The arbitration provision stipulat-
ed that AT&T had to pay the costs of all nonfrivolous claims; that
either party could bring its claim in small claims court instead of
arbitration; that the arbitrator had discretion to award whatever
form of relief he deemed appropriate; and that for disputes involv-
ing amounts less than $10,000, the Concepcions could conduct ar-
bitration by telephone, in person, or by paper submission.9 The
agreement further required that arbitration take place in the
1. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
3. Id.
4. Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. C, AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(No. 09-893), 2010 WL 6617833, at *61a).
5. See id. The arbitration provision stipulated that "'the arbitrator may not consoli-
date more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a rep-
resentative or class proceeding. Id. at 1744 n.2 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 4).
6. Id. at 1744.
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county of the customer's billing address. ' ° The arbitration provi-
sion forbade AT&T from requesting that the claimant reimburse
AT&T's attorney's fees." Finally, if the arbitrator awarded the
claimant damages greater than the company's final settlement
offer, AT&T had to pay that claimant both a minimum award of
$7,50012 and double the claimant's attorney's fees.13
The Concepcions bought AT&T cellular telephone service that
the company marketed as including free cell phones.14 According-
ly, AT&T did not charge the Concepcions for their phones under
the contract. 15 Instead, the company charged the Concepcions a
sales tax of $30.22, based on the retail value of the customers'
"free" phones. 6
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AT& T MOBILITY
In 2006, the Concepcions brought suit against AT&T in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Califor-
nia. 7 Their suit was consolidated with a class action alleging, in-
ter alia, that by requiring the Concepcions to pay sales tax on
phones it marketed as "free," AT&T had falsely advertised its ser-
vices and committed fraud.'" AT&T filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration pursuant to the contract, and the Concepcions opposed the
motion.'9 They argued that the arbitration agreement was uncon-
scionable, because it prohibited class arbitration.2" The district
court denied AT&T's motion.2 It held that the arbitration clause
was unconscionable, based on the California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.22 The Ninth Circuit
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1744.
12. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. In 2009 this amount was increased to $10,000.
Id. at 1744 n.3 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 7, AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-
893), 2010 WL 3017755 at *8).




17. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744; see Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-1167,
2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1744-45.
20. Id. at 1745.
21. Id.
22. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 ("'When the waiver is found in a consumer con-
tract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consum-
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Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, further
stating that Discover Bank did not unjustly target arbitration
agreements-it merely reflected the unconscionability analysis
generally applicable to contracts in California. 23  Therefore, the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") did not preempt the Discover
Bank rule.24 The Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
tiorari.25
III. AT&T MOBILITY AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Issue and Holding on Certiorari
The question before the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility was
whether § 2 of the FAA2 preempted California's Discover Bank
rule, which recognizes as unconscionable a class arbitration waiv-
er in a consumer adhesion contract wherein disputes are likely for
small damages, and the party of inferior bargaining power has
alleged the defrauding of many customers out of small amounts of
money. Justice Scalia delivered the Court's opinion. 2' The ma-
jority, in a 5-4 decision, held that the FAA preempts the Discover
Bank rule, because the rule conflicts with Congress' purposes and
objectives in creating the Act.29
B. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia starts by recognizing the complexity of the issue
at hand." If California law placed a blanket prohibition on arbi-
tration of a particular claim, that law would clearly be preempted
ers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable
under California law and should not be enforced.'" (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740)). Apart
from its final ruling, the district court acknowledged that the arbitration provision did have
some positive attributes. Id. The court praised the $7,500 minimum award as a "'substan-
tial inducement for the consumer to pursue the claim in arbitration'" if the informal dispute
resolution process was of no avail. Id. (quoting Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11). Further,
the court recognized that AT&T consumers would be at a disadvantage in a class action.
Id. (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11-12).
23. Id. (citing Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
27. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
28. Id. at 1744.
29. Id. at 1753.
30. Id. at 1747.
922 Vol. 50
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
by the FAA, ' the primary purpose of which is to "'ensur[e] that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.' ' 2  Justice Scalia acknowledges that the issue becomes
complicated when a party alleges, as did AT&T, that a state court
applied a standard contract defense, i.e., unconscionability, in
such a way as to inhibit arbitration.3  The majority classifies
AT&T Mobility as such a case.34 The majority asserts that the
overall purpose of the FAA, evident in §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the Act, is
to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements pursuant
to their terms so as to promote efficient proceedings. Justice
Scalia concludes that a law requiring class arbitration to be avail-
able, such as Discover Bank, undermines arbitration's basic at-
tributes and therefore contravenes the FAA.36
The majority then attacks the dissent's reference to Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 37 wherein the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that the FAA's overall purpose is to promote efficient
proceedings.3 ' The majority states that the dissent misleads by
taking the Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. reference wholly out of con-
text.39 Justice Scalia notes that after the Court addressed the
FAA's overall purpose in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, it then recog-
nized that Congress was quite aware that the FAA facilitates effi-
cient dispute resolution.40 Justice Scalia avers that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly referred to the FAA as reflecting both a state
pro-arbitration policy4' and a federal pro-arbitration policy-
31. Id. (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)).
32. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
33. Id. at 1747.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1748. Justice Scalia underscores that this purpose is readily apparent from
the FAA's text in stating that:
Section 2 makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" as writ-
ten (subject, of course, to the savings clause); § 3 requires courts to stay litigation of
arbitral claims pending arbitration of those claims "in accordance with the terms of
the agreement;" and § 4 requires courts to compel arbitration "in accordance with the
terms of the agreement" upon the motion of either party to the agreement ....
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2006)).
36. Id.
37. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
38. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1757
(Breyer, J., dissenting)).
39. Id.
40. Id. ("This is not to say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legis-
lation for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it .... " (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 470 U.S. at 220)).




regardless of any opposing state policies." Accordingly, Justice
Scalia writes that in Preston v. Ferrer," the Supreme Court held
that the FAA preempted a state law calling for a party to exhaust
its administrative remedies before going to arbitration, as this
requirement would frustrate arbitration's efficient resolution of
claims.'
The majority analogizes Discover Bank as a similar hindrance to
arbitration.45 When the Discover Bank rule permits a party to a
consumer adhesion contract to demand class arbitration, the rule
interferes with the fundamental characteristic of arbitration-the
efficient resolution of controversies.46 The majority contends that
Discover Bank's facially narrow rule is anachronistic, as nowadays
most, if not all, consumer contracts are adhesion contracts.47 Fur-
thermore, Justice Scalia writes that the requirement of small
damages is at best vague and the requirement that a consumer
allege fraud is overly broad.4" Justice Scalia holds that the broad
scope of the Discover Bank rule contravenes the FAA.49
The majority premises its holding on Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp."° In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme
Court determined that an arbitration panel went beyond the scope
of its power under the FAA's § 10(a)(4) 1 when it used public poli-
cy-rather than the arbitration provision at issue or any contract
law principle in general-to compel class procedures.52 The Court
held that the provision in question could not be construed to per-
mit class procedures when, in fact, the provision made no mention
42. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
43. 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
44. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 ("A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate
is to achieve 'streamlined proceedings and expeditious results,' which objective would be
'frustrated' by requiring a dispute to be heard by an agency first." (quoting Preston, 552
U.S. at 357-58)).
45. Id. at 1750.
46. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abro-
gated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740).
47. Id. (citing Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir.
2004); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)).
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
50. Id. (citing 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
51. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006) ("[Tlhe United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration... where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.").
52. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773-76).
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of the mechanism, because the differences between bilateral arbi-
tration and class arbitration are quite significant. 3 Justice Scalia
contends that Discover Bank embodies the same manufactured
class arbitration, ignorant of the fundamental differences between
the two arbitration mechanisms and is therefore, as in Stolt-
Nielsen, inconsistent with the FAA.54 The majority then discusses
55the significant aforementioned differences.
Class arbitration does not have the cardinal advantage of arbi-
tration-informality.56 Rather, class arbitration's collateral proce-
dural requirements (i.e., determining whether the named parties
adequately represent the class) are costly and slow down arbitra-
tion proceedings.57 Class arbitration by definition requires proce-
dural formality, and therefore, expressly contradicts arbitration's
cardinal advantage of informality. 5 The majority finds it doubtful
that Congress' intent in drafting the FAA was to give the arbitra-
tor the responsibility of addressing these additional procedural
requirements. 59 Rather, the majority highlights that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank that class arbitra-
tion is a more recent phenomenon. 0
Finally, Justice Scalia writes that the risk to defendants is am-
plified with class arbitration. 61  Bilateral arbitration presents a
risk of uncorrected error because it lacks an appellate process.62
This risk is exponentially increased when thousands of claimants
53. Id. at 1750 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776).
54. Id. at 1750-51.
55. Id. at 1751.
56. Id.
57. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51. Scalia cites the following statistic:
"[a]ccording to the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the average consumer arbitra-
tion between January and August 2007 resulted in a disposition on the merits in six
months...." Id. at 1751 (citing Analysis of the AAA's Consumer Arbitration Caseload, AM.
ARB. ASS'N,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDFjsessionid=kbxxPbvFTQmmP8cycYdvLjfxamgYV4dLDBN
sfjxlgH347bxlGqLL!-1786312740?doc=ADRSTG_004325 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012)).
Further, Scalia writes, "[a] s of September 2009, the AAA had opened 283 class arbitrations.
Id. Of those, 121 remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or dismissed. Not
a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits." Id. (citing Brief for
Am. Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct.
1758 (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309).
58. Id. at 1751 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1751-52 ("'[Cllass arbitration is a relatively recent development'. . . [aind it is
at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that
third parties' due process rights are satisfied." (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740).
61. Id. at 1752.
62. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
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can join in a class proceeding that will conclude in a single deci-
sion on the merits of each claim. Justice Scalia juxtaposes class
arbitration with class litigation, wherein a claimant has the option
of multilayered review when de novo review is applied to ques-
tions of law.' In contrast, the FAA's review provision is limited to
misconduct, not mistake of law.65 Justice Scalia notes that the
district court determined that the Concepcions would have been
better off with their bilateral arbitration agreement than as mem-
bers of a class, where their claim would likely take years to resolve
and culminate only in a small percentage of a small class award.66
In conclusion, the majority reverses and remands the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and holds that the Dis-
cover Bank rule contravenes the express purposes and objectives
of Congress67 and is thus preempted by the FAA.6"
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas concurs with the majority's decision, writing
separately to discuss how he would narrow the scope of § 2 con-
tract defenses to exclude unconscionability via a close analysis of
the FAA text.69 Justice Thomas argues that it would be ridiculous
to propose that § 2 mandates that the arbitration defense applies
to just "any contract." ° Section 2 suggests that courts cannot use
a state public policy disfavoring arbitration as a basis for ruling
that arbitration agreements are unenforceable.7' Justice Thomas
63. Id.
64. Id. The majority quotes § 10 of the FAA, wherein a court is permitted to:
[V]acate an arbitral award only where the award "was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means"; "there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators"; "the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing ... or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy[,] or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"; or if the "arbi-
trators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award.., was not made."
Id. at 1752 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1753 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at
*12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008)).
67. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas starts his concurrence by quoting § 2
of the FAA, that an arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. (quot-
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asserts that there is a further limit on the contract defenses al-
lowable under § 2.72
Arguing a textual interpretation, Justice Thomas contends that
the FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be enforced, except
when a party successfully challenges that agreement's formation,
such as on the basis of fraud or duress." Under this analysis, Jus-
tice Thomas would reverse the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
ruling, because the district court erroneously relied on Discover
Bank, which had nothing to do with a deficiency in the formation
of an agreement and everything to do with the substance of an
agreement."4
Justice Thomas juxtaposes § 2's text requiring that an arbitra-
tion provision be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," with the
exception clause, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."75 Justice Thomas places
great meaning on the lack of parallelism between the two clauses;
only "irrevocable" has its counterpart in the latter clause.76 Jus-
tice Thomas acknowledges that the exact difference between "val-
id," "irrevocable," and "enforceable" is unclear and that the terms
are not defined in the statute.77 However, he argues that this does
not mean that one can dismiss Congress' conspicuous omission.78
72. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). The concurring opin-
ion later acknowledges that the majority's analysis will frequently lead to the same result
as the concurrence's textual interpretation. Id. at 1754.
73. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C §§ 2, 4). Justice Thomas writes, "[a]s I would read it, the FAA
requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully challenges
the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress." Id. Fur-
ther, the concurrence argues:
The interpretation I suggest would be consistent with our precedent ... every specific
contract defense that the Court has acknowledged is applicable under § 2 relates to
contract formation. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996),
this Court said that fraud, duress, and unconscionability "may be applied to invali-
date arbitration agreements without contravening § 2."
Id. at 1755.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1754 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
76. Id. Thomas analyzes:
Significantly, the statute does not parallel the words "valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able" by referencing the grounds as exist for the "invalidation, revocation, or
nonenforcement" of any contract. Nor does the statute use a different word or phrase
entirely that might arguably encompass validity, revocability, and enforceability.
The use only of 'revocation' and the conspicuous omission of 'invalidation' and
'nonenforcement' suggest that the exception does not include all defenses applicable
to any contract but rather some subset of these defenses.
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
77. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id.
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Rather, Justice Thomas contends that this ambiguity can be re-
solved through a classic statutory interpretation technique of
seeking clarification in the text of the statute as a whole.79
Justice Thomas finds clarification in § 4, which mandates that
when a party is in federal court to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment, the court must order arbitration per the terms of the
agreement after concluding that the making of the arbitration
agreement is not at issue. 0 Justice Thomas synthesizes § 2 and §
4 and concludes that the grounds for revocation would be the
grounds associated with the making of the agreement." Thus,
contract defenses not associated with the making of an agree-
ment, 2 such as public policy concerns, cannot be used to argue the
unenforceability of an arbitration provision. 3
Returning to the Discover Bank rule, Justice Thomas deter-
mines the question to be whether the rule pertains to the making
of an arbitration agreement.' Justice Thomas finds that it does
not. 5 Justice Thomas argues that the California Supreme Court's
holding in Discover Bank 6 regarding class arbitration waivers in
consumer adhesion contracts pertains to the degree to which the
waiver is unlawfully exculpatory.8 7 He points out that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did not hold that a consumer would enter
into such a contract only because of fraud or duress--defects in
the formation of a contract, as opposed to its substance.88 The con-
currence cites Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts8 9 as stating
that exculpatory contracts are the classic example of contracts un-
enforceable under public policy.9
79. Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
80. Id. ("[JU]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue,' the court must order arbitration 'in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.'" (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4)).
81. Id. at 1754-55.
82. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring) (listing duress, fraud, or





86. Id. at 1753. Justice Thomas states the Discover Bank holding as: "class action
waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully exculpatory." Id.
at 1755 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005), abro-
gated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
87. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1755-56.
89. GRACE M. GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 85.1, 85.17, 85.18 (rev. ed. 2003).
90. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas concludes that finding a contract unenforceable
on public-policy grounds relates to the substance of an agreement,
not the making of an agreement. 91 Therefore, Justice Thomas
finds that the Discover Bank rule is not a basis for a contract's
revocation, as referenced in § 2.92 The concurrence concludes that
the FAA preempts the Discover Bank rule and that the
Concepcions' bilateral arbitration agreement must be enforced.93
D. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion94
Justice Breyer argues that the Discover Bank rule is consistent
with the primary objective of § 2, because it merely refers to par-
ticular circumstances in which class waivers would be unenforce-
able in any contract.95 The foundation of the Discover Bank rule,
Justice Breyer writes, is in section 1668 of the California Civil
Code, which mandates that contracts attempting to exempt a par-
ty from its legal responsibility are unlawful.96 Second, section
1670.5(a) permits courts to render unenforceable an unconsciona-
ble contract clause.9 7 The dissent contends that the California Su-
preme Court merely applied these legal principles to conclude that
some class waivers in consumer arbitration provisions are uncon-
scionable-not that every class waiver is unconscionable.98 Justice
91. Id.
92. Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
93. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Jus-
tice Breyer's dissent. Id.
95. Id. (explaining that an arbitration provision "'shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract'" (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
96. Id. (stating that contracts are unlawful "'which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own ... violation of law'" (quoting
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985))).
97. Id. (stating that courts may "'limit the application of any unconscionable clause' [to]
avoid any unconscionable result" (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985))).
98. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes
Discover Bank as follows:
[W]hen a class action waiver "is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting
in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power
has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of in-
dividually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice the exemp-
tion of the party from responsibility 'for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person
or property of another' . .. [In such a situation, the] "waivers are unconscionable un-
der California law and should not be enforced."
Id. at 1756-57 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).). Justice Breyer
contends that "[tihe Discover Bank rule does not create a 'blanket policy in California
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Breyer avers that Discover Bank is compatible with the FAA's
language, because the California Supreme Court noted that the
rule applies to both contracts with class arbitration waivers and
contracts with class action waivers. 99 Therefore, Justice Breyer
concludes, the rule falls directly within the purview of the § 2 ex-
ception allowing courts to refuse to enforce arbitration provisions
on grounds that would lead to any contract's revocation. '
Further, the dissent argues that the Discover Bank rule is con-
sistent with the FAA's primary purpose, which Justice Breyer
states is to provide for the judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements. '1 The dissent refutes the majority's argument that
the Discover Bank rule contravenes the intent of the FAA because
it renders arbitration procedures more inefficient.' 2  Justice
Breyer contends that, in reality, class arbitration is harmonious
with the general function of arbitration.0 3 Indeed, the dissent
writes, the American Arbitration Association stated to the United
States Supreme Court that class arbitration is fair and efficient.0 4
Further, class arbitration is a familiar procedure in California and
other jurisdictions.0 '
Moreover, the dissent strongly objects to the majority's compari-
son of class arbitration with bilateral arbitration, as part of the
majority's argument that Discover Bank is inconsistent with the
FAA.0 6 Rather, Justice Breyer writes that the applicable compar-
against class action waivers in the consumer context.' Id. at 1757 (quoting Provencher v.
Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). Rather, Discover Bank is an "'ap-
plication of a more general [unconscionabilityl principle." Id. (quoting Gentry v. Superior
Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564. (2007)). Accordingly, the dissent points out that courts analyzing
such waivers under California law have enforced these waivers when general
unconscionability standards have been met. Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Diamond Foods, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 459-62 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 305-07 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); Smith v. AmeriCredit Financial Servs., No. 09cv1076, 2009 WL 4895280, at *3-9
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009)).
99. Id. at 1757 (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1112).
100. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
101. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
102. Id. at 1758.
103. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
104. Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, supra note 57).
105. Id. (citing Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(depublished); JAMS, THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2009), avail-
able at http'//www.jamsadr.com/filesfUploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMSClassActionProcedures-2009.pdf; Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitra-
tions (2003), AM. ARB. ASS'N, httpJ/www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited Apr. 25,
2011)).
106. Id. at 1759 (citingAT&TMobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (majority opinion)).
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ison is between class arbitration and class actions. °7 The dissent
cites statistics in the American Arbitration Association's Amicus
Brief demonstrating that class arbitration takes more time than
bilateral arbitration, but less time than class actions.10 There-
fore, if efficient resolution of claims is the primary aim of the FAA,
then, argues Justice Breyer, the Discouer Bank rule would rein-
force that "primary purpose."109
Justice Breyer writes that California simply applied the same
unconscionability analysis to the class arbitration waiver in the
Concepcions' contract as it would have applied to a class action
waiver in any other contract.110 Justice Breyer adamantly argues
that there is no support for the majority's views in United States
Supreme Court precedent."11 The Court has ruled on a significant
number of cases relating to FAA requirements, but the FAA has
never been used to preempt a state statute placing arbitration on
the same footing as judicial proceedings.112
The States have a significant role, pursuant to the § 2 savings
clause, to determine the exact grounds for a contract's revoca-
tion.1 3 This reflects the basic federal principle that Congress can-
not brusquely pre-empt state law.114 Justice Breyer firmly con-
cludes that the Supreme Court must reflect this basic principle in
its actions by upholding the text of the FAA in affirming Califor-
nia's law and the ruling of the Ninth Circuit.'
107. Id.
108. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that AAA statis-
tics "'suggest ... class arbitration proceedings take more time than the average commercial
arbitration, but may take less time than the average class action in court" (quoting Brief
for Am. Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 57)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1760. Justice Breyer asks, "[i]f California had applied its law of duress to
void an arbitration agreement, would it matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement
were efficient?" Id.
111. Id. at 1761.
112. Id. ("Courts are not at liberty to shirk the process of [contractual] construction
under the empire of a belief that arbitration is beneficent any more than they may shirk it
if their belief happens to the contrary." (quoting Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg., 169
N.E. 386, 391 (N.Y. 1929)).
113. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2006)).
114. Id. ("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."




IV. THE HISTORICAL NEXUS OF ARBITRATION,
UNCONSCIONABILITY, AND THE CLASS MECHANISM
The FAA promulgated the judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements pursuant to their terms." 6 Section 2, its cornerstone,
mandates that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."" 7 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court of the United States maintains that arbitration
agreements are to be analyzed just like a contract."'
The contract defense at issue in AT&T Mobility is
unconscionability,' 9 which is best defined as "an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties, together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other par-
ty."1 2° Courts make the determination as to whether a contract or
a clause therein is unconscionable by considering all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the formation of the contract.1 21 There is
no litmus test, which has resulted in much judicial consternation
and a morass of law relating to the doctrine.'
22
A frequent attempt at solidifying a clear-cut formula is the "pro-
cedural" versus "substantive" unconscionability analysis.1 23  This
analysis sets forth the proposition that a contract or clause therein
is unenforceable if it evidences both procedural unconscionability
and substantive unconscionability.' 24  Some jurisdictions, includ-
ing California, implement this analysis via a sliding-scale test.
1 25
Procedural unconscionability addresses the manner in which a
116. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
117. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
118. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); see also Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). Only "generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening § 2... . Courts may not, however, invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions." Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (citations omitted).
119. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
120. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
121. Id.
122. John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1, 2
(1969).
123. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Mur-
ray, supra note 122, at 21.
124. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298
F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002)).
125. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1170
(quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000)).
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contract is negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at the
time of that negotiation.1 26  Surprise and oppression are key fea-
tures. '27 Substantive unconscionability addresses the actual terms
of the agreement and whether those terms favor one party enough
to "shock the conscience. "12 The cumbersome nature of the
unconscionability doctrine'29 has significantly reduced its fruitful
application. 131 Currently, it is most frequently used to analyze
consumer service adhesion contracts and employment arbitration
provisions.'
31
Class arbitration is a relatively recent phenomenon. 132 Congress
did not conceive of it when the FAA was enacted. 33 Before AT&T
Mobility, the United States Supreme Court infrequently analyzed
class arbitration, but the Court set the stage for its AT&T Mobili-
ty ruling with Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.134
A. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.
Stolt-Nielsen's shipping companies provide parcel tankers 135 to
customers needing to transport small quantities of liquids.
1 36
AnimalFeeds was such a customer and filed a class action anti-
trust suit against the company for price-fixing.'37 AnimalFeeds
126. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Kinney v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). The adhesion contract is an example of when this two-step analysis
hits a roadblock. An adhesion contract is procedurally unconscionable, regardless of the
contract's substance-the weaker party has been denied an opportunity to negotiate. JOHN
E. MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 470-71 (6th ed. 2006). However, this
same adhesion contract may be absent of any harmful terms, rendering it free of any sub-
stantive unconscionability. Id. Consumer contracts nowadays are almost exclusively con-
tracts of adhesion. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (citing
Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004)). Courts now
analyze a contract's quality of adhesion as one factor of many in an unconscionability anal-
ysis. MURRAY, supra, at 470. Therefore, procedural unconscionability alone is not disposi-
tive. Id. Accordingly, some jurisdictions reach an unconscionability determination based
solely on substantive unconscionability. Id.
129. Murray, supra note 122, at 13.
130. MURRAY, supra note 128, at 472.
131. Id.
132. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
133. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (2011).
134. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010)).
135. Parcel tankers are tankers with separately chartered compartments. Stolt-Nielsen,
130 S. Ct. at 1764.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1761.
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sought arbitration, pursuant to its standard contract'38 with Stolt-
Nielsen.'39 The parties consented to submit the question to a pan-
el of arbitrators of whether their arbitration agreement provided
for class arbitration. 4 ' The arbitration clause in their contract
was completely silent on the issue.14 ' The panel concluded that
the parties' arbitration clause did provide for class arbitration.'42
However, the district court vacated the award and concluded that
the panel's decision contradicted the federal maritime law rule
mandating that contracts must be construed in light of custom
and usage. 43 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed, arguing that Stolt-Nielsen cited no authority that used
maritime custom and usage to contravene class arbitration.1
44
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Justice Alito wrote for the majority, which held, inter alia, that to
require parties to submit their claims to class arbitration when
those parties have not agreed to such arbitration contravenes the
Federal Arbitration Act-at the core of which is the principle that
arbitration is a matter of consent.'45 Justice Alito wrote that the
first fundamental difference between the two mechanisms is that
class arbitration is designed to resolve hundreds or perhaps thou-
sands of parties' disputes.'46 Second, there is no presumption of
privacy and confidentiality in class arbitration as exists in bilat-
eral arbitration.'47 Third, a class arbitrator's award binds not only
the parties present, but also the parties that are absent.4 '
Fourth, the commercial stakes of class arbitration are comparable
to class action litigation: they are exponentially greater than in
bilateral arbitration, and judicial review is only available under
very limited circumstances.'49 In AT&T Mobility, Justice Scalia
used Justice Alito's discussion of these fundamental differences to
138. Id. A standard contract in the maritime trade is called a "charter party." Id.
139. Id.
140. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1761.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1761.
143. Id. at 1766.
144. Id.
145. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. 1776 (citation omitted). 'Under the Class Rules, 'the presumption of privacy
and confidentiality' that applies in many bilateral arbitrations 'shall not apply in class
arbitrations.'" Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Arb. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents at add. A, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2009) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309 at
*10a).
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. (citation omitted). See discussion infra Part V.E.
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abrogate Discover Bank, a landmark Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case prohibiting class arbitration waivers in certain types of
consumer adhesion contracts.
150
B. Discover Bank v. Superior Court151
Californian Christopher Boehr entered into a credit card agree-
ment with Discover Bank.152 The agreement's choice-of-law clause
provided that Delaware law controlled the parties' agreement.
1 3
The credit card company subsequently amended the agreement
unilaterally to include an arbitration clause that, inter alia, pro-
hibited either party from seeking class arbitration." If cardhold-
ers did not agree to the new provision, they had to notify Discover
Bank and close their accounts.1 5 Otherwise, they would be
deemed to have accepted the new arbitration clause."
Plaintiff Boeher did not notify Discover Bank about his objection
to the clause.5 7 Two years after the amendment, Boeher filed a
putative class action against Discover Bank for breach of contract
and violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act. ' Boeher al-
leged that Discover Bank had breached its agreement with Boeher
by charging him a late fee on payments that were received on
their due date but after 1:00 p.m.-Discover Bank's undisclosed
cut-off time. 5 9 Also, Discover Bank charged a periodic finance
charge on new purchases when it received payments on their due
date but after the undisclosed 1:00 p.m. cut-off time.'60
Discover Bank moved to compel bilateral arbitration and to
dismiss Boeher's class action pursuant to the parties' arbitration
agreement. 161 Boeher opposed the motion and argued, inter alia,
that the class action waiver was unconscionable, and therefore,
unenforceable pursuant to California law.'62 Defendant Discover
150. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011); Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct.
1740.
151. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100.
152. Id. at 1103.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1104.
156. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1104.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citation omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1104.
162. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Bank countered that the FAA requires an arbitration agreement
to be enforced pursuant to its terms, whether or not those terms
include class waivers.163 The credit card company argued that § 2
of the FAA prohibits a court from declaring an arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable pursuant to state laws solely pertaining to
arbitration clauses.
1 6 4
The trial court granted Discover Bank's motion to compel arbi-
tration.165 However, the tables turned shortly thereafter when the
Fourth District Court of Appeals decided Szetela v. Discover
Bank.166 It held that a nearly-identical class action waiver was
unconscionable.167 Boeher moved for reconsideration of the trial
court order enforcing Discover Bank's class action waiver.16 The
trial court determined that Szetela was now the controlling au-
thority, and held that a class arbitration waiver was unconsciona-
ble and unenforceable. 69 The trial court severed the class arbitra-
tion waiver from the parties' agreement and ordered Boeher to
submit his claims to bilateral arbitration, with an option to seek
certification of an arbitration class.
170
However, the trial court's reconsideration was to no avail.
17'
The Court of Appeals granted Discover Bank's writ petition re-
questing reinstatement of the trial court's original order enforcing
the entire arbitration clause and held that the FAA preempted
California's law that class arbitration waivers are unconsciona-
ble. 172 The California Supreme Court then granted review.'73 It
reaffirmed California's support of class action lawsuits and under-
scored the United States Supreme Court's recognition that the
fundamental policy behind the class mechanism is to solve the
problem of small-damages claims being a disincentive for an indi-
vidual to bring a claim on his own. 174 The California Supreme
Court asserted that it had repeatedly determined that class ac-
tions and class arbitration in the context of consumer agreements
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1104 (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d




170. Id. at 1104-5.
171. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1105.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1105-06.
936 Vol. 50
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
are frequently inseparable from the assertion of substantive
rights.
175
The court reversed and remanded and held that a class arbitra-
tion waiver in a consumer contract of adhesion is unconscionable
when disputes are likely to be for small damages, and the claim-
ant has alleged that the party of superior bargaining power delib-
erately defrauded many customers out of small sums of money.
1 76
Addressing the issue of whether § 2 of the FAA preempted Cali-
fornia law barring class arbitration waivers, the California Su-
preme Court concluded that it did not.
177
The Discover Bank dissent argued that the majority erred in
concluding that the Court of Appeals should address the Delaware
choice-of-law issue on remand after not having previously ad-
dressed whether the controlling Delaware law would mandate the
class arbitration waiver's enforcement. 178 The dissent emphasized
that the parties explicitly agreed that Delaware law would control
their agreement.179 Irrespective of California's fundamental public
policy against class arbitration waivers, the dissent averred that
the court was required to evaluate the arbitration provision solely
under Delaware law. 180 Delaware enforces class arbitration waiv-
ers in consumer contracts of adhesion.'81 Therefore, the dissent
concluded that the class arbitration waiver should be enforced.
182
Further, the dissent adamantly rejected the majority's equation of
the inability of one party to seek a class remedy with the other
party's exculpation." 3 The dissent emphasized that class reme-
dies are meant to facilitate the assertion of legal rights-they are
not meant as the sole means to assert those legal rights. 4
175. Id. at 1109.
176. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109. The court made a point to state that it did not
hold that all waivers are per se unconscionable. Id.
177. Id. at 1110.
178. Id. at 1118 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1118 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1119.




C. The Circuit Split Embodied in the Decisions of the Third and
Ninth Circuits
Discover Bank embodies the contentious circuit split on the is-
sue of class arbitration waivers.18 ' The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to strike down a class arbitra-
tion waiver in Ting v. AT&T."8 6 Darcy Ting, as part of a class ac-
tion, filed suit against AT&T for violating California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act and the state's Unfair Practices Act. ' Ting
alleged, inter alia, that AT&T prohibited customers from pursuing
class claims against AT&T. 88 The district court found the parties'
agreement unconscionable and in violation of California public
policy, issuing a permanent injunction against enforcement of two
of its sections.' 9 AT&T appealed and argued, inter alia, that the
FAA preempted California consumer-protection laws.19 °  The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part.19 The court asserted that it already recognized that federal
courts may apply state-law contract defenses involving the validi-
ty, enforceability, and revocability of contracts-provided that
these defenses are generally applied to all contracts, and not solely
to arbitration agreements.
192
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the arbitration clause
unconscionable due to its quality of adhesion, its confidentiality
requirement, and its fee-splitting arrangement.193  Regarding
AT&T's claim that the lower court applied California
unconscionability law in direct contravention of the FAA, the court
reasoned that the district court had merely directed its animosity
at the oppressive and self-exculpating means by which AT&T im-
posed arbitration on its customers.194
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals' Gay v. CreditInform'95 deci-
sion epitomizes the alternative view in the circuit split.196 Appel-
185. Id. at 1118.
186. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).




191. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130.
192. Id. at 1148 (quoting Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir.
2001)).
193. Id. at 1149-52.
194. Id. at 1152.
195. 511 F.3d 369 (2007).
196. Gay, 511 F.3d at 369.
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lant consumer Mary Gay bought credit repair services from de-
fendant, Intersections. 97 For seven months she paid $4.99 per
month to Intersections, pursuant to the parties' agreement, and
made those payments before Intersections finished performing its
agreed-upon services.198 Appellant brought a putative class action
suit, and claimed that the credit repair company violated the
Credit Repair Organizations Act and the Pennsylvania Credit
Services Act when the company required her to waive particular
rights that these statutes provided.'99
Intersections moved to compel arbitration, and the district court
ordered that the parties resolve the dispute via bilateral arbitra-
tion, pursuant to the class arbitration waiver in the parties' pur-
chase agreement. °0 Mary Gay appealed the order and argued,
inter alia, that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, pursu-
ant to Pennsylvania law.2"1 Intersections contended that Virginia
law controlled the contract's terms of use, pursuant to the choice-
of-law clause in the parties' agreement.2 2 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized that the core principle of the FAA is that
arbitration is a "matter of consent."20 3 This freedom, therefore,
covers any choice-of-law clause that governs an arbitration agree-
ment.
20 4
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals began its unconscionability
analysis of the arbitration provision pursuant to the Virginia
choice-of-law clause.20 5 The court found no foundation in Virginia
law for Gay's contention that the arbitration clause was uncon-
scionable, because she had not negotiated it.20 6 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that while Mary Gay did not have In-
tersections' degree of bargaining power, the parties' agreement did
not "shock the conscience."20 7




201. Gay, 511 F.3d at 387.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 388-89 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
204. Id. at 389.
205. Id. at 389-91.
206. Gay, 511 F.3d at 391 (defining an unconscionable agreement as one wherein "'no
man in his senses and not under a delusion would make, on the one hand, and as no fair
man would accept, on the other.' The inequality must be so gross as to shock the con-
science" (quoting Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v. Thorncroft Co., 416 S.E.2d 229, 231 (Va. 1992))).
207. Id. at 391-92 (quoting Mgmt. Enters., Inc., 416 S.E.2d at 231).
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After the court dismissed Mary Gay's unconscionability claim
pursuant to Virginia law, the court analyzed, as an aside, the
unconscionability claim pursuant to Pennsylvania law.2"' In
Pennsylvania, a two-prong unconscionability analysis is used to
determine whether (1) the terms of the agreement are unreasona-
bly favorable to the contract drafter, and (2) there is no meaning-
ful choice for the disfavored party.2"9 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that Pennsylvania courts would also enforce
the agreement, because inequality of bargaining power on its own
was not a sufficient basis to render a class arbitration wavier un-
enforceable.210 Further, the court wrote that class arbitration
waivers address a procedural right, which can always be
waived.211
The court of appeals concluded that Mary Gay based her
unconscionability argument on what the arbitration agreement
itself stipulated.2 12 This contravened the FAA's explicit mandate
that a court can find an arbitration agreement unenforceable sole-
ly pursuant to general contract principles. 2 3 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order to compel bi-
lateral arbitration and held, inter alia, that the arbitration provi-
sion was not unenforceable pursuant to state contract laws re-
garding unconscionability.1 4
V. How JUSTICE SCALIA DEFTLY PREVENTS A PER SE
UNCONSCIONABILITY THREAT TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT,
AN EXAMINATION OF AT&T MOBILITY VIA TWO ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF ANALYSIS, AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
215
The United States Supreme Court has been consistent and rig-
orous in its broad construction of the FAA, holding that the FAA
preempts state laws that in any way hinder the enforceability of
208. Id.
209. Id. at 392 (quoting Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir.
1999)).
210. Id. (quoting Harris, 183 F.3d at 183).
211. Gay, 511 F.3d at 392 (quoting Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d
Cir.2000)).
212. Id. at 395.
213. Id. at 378 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
214. Id.
215. The author expresses much appreciation to Professor John E. Murray, Jr. for his
generosity of time, spirit, and guidance during the preparation of this case note.
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arbitration clauses.216  Towards that end, the Court reasserts in
AT&T Mobility that the FAA's purpose is a liberal federal policy
promoting the enforcement of arbitration clauses pursuant to their
terms.217
216. John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability and the Apotheosis of Arbitration 9-10
(Sept. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript). Charles L. Knapp offers a case history of the
United States Supreme Court's consistent broad construction of the FAA:
See the following United States Supreme Court cases (in chronological order): Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967) (finding that
FAA was based on full reach of interstate commerce power; charge of fraud in in-
ducement of contract arbitrable unless fraud directed specifically to arbitration
clause); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) ("[The FAA establishes] liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.
• . [Als a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10-16 (1984) (holding that the FAA is binding on state courts and the California stat-
ute requiring judicial resolution of claims preempted by the FAA); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (holding that fed-
eral antitrust claims are arbitrable under the FAA; arbitration clause upheld);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding customers'
claims against brokerage house arbitrable, both under Securities Exchange Act and
under RICO); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding
that federal age discrimination claims are arbitrable in absence of clear showing of
congressional intent to the contrary); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265 (1995) (finding that Congress intended the FAA to extend to full reach of
commerce power and declining invitation to overrule Southland); Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA preempts state statute im-
posing formal requirements on arbitration agreements); Green Tree Fin. Corp. -Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that the risk that plaintiff with claim under
Truth In Lending Act would be prevented from pursuing claim by costs of arbitration
not sufficient to avoid arbitration in absence of specific showing of prohibitive costs);
Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001) (stating that FAA's
exception for employees "engaged in commerce" would be narrowly construed, limited
to persons actually engaged in "transportation").
Id. (quoting Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 776 n.59 (2002)). Since Knapp's article, further United
States Supreme Court cases continue to reflect a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.
See Rent-A-Center., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) ("[Wlhere the al-
leged fraud that induced the whole contract equally induced the agreement to arbitrate
which was part of that contract-we nonetheless require the basis of challenge to be directed
specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the court will intervene."); Preston v.
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008) ("[W]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising
under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial
or administrative, are superseded by the FAA."); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) ("[R]egardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or
state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the
arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator."); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52,
53 (2003) ("[Tlhere is a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to make enforceable,
pursuant to the FAA, an arbitration provision included in [a debt-restructuring] agreement
[executed in Alabama by Alabama residents].").
217. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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A. The AT&T-Concepcion Arbitration Clause
AT&T's claim that the FAA preempts the Discover Bank prohi-
bition of particular class arbitration waivers required the Su-
preme Court to determine that bilateral arbitration, pursuant to
the parties' agreement, is an adequate mechanism for defending
the parties' statutory rights.21 Under such a determination, a
clause precluding class arbitration is not unconscionable, because
it is not a term that is unreasonably favorable to one party to the
contract.219
The district court held in AT&T Mobility that the arbitration
provision was unconscionable, because its bilateral arbitration
clause was not an adequate substitute for class arbitration.22 °
However, after a close examination of that bilateral arbitration
provision, it is overwhelmingly apparent that AT&T provided its
consumers every possible concession to avoid the hazards of un-
conscionable arbitration clauses.22' Moreover, the parties' arbitra-
tion clause put the Concepcions in as good a position, if not better,
than they would have been in had their cellular telephone contract
been correctly performed. The district court repeatedly acknowl-
edged this reality.222
The parties' agreement stipulated that all disputes between
AT&T and its customers could be resolved in either small-claims
court or bilateral arbitration.223 Therefore, arbitration was by no
218. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006).
219. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
220. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2008).
221. Id. at *2-3. See Murray, supra note 216, at 11-12 (recognizing the primary factors
that render an arbitration clause unconscionable: fee-splitting, "loser-pays," choice of ven-
ue favoring the stronger party, remedy preclusion, and court-of-law claims for the favored
party).
222. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11-12. "Nearly all consumers who pursue the infor-
mal claims process are very likely to be compensated promptly and in full." Id. at *11. "In
contrast, it appears that consumers who are members of a class do not fare as well." Id.
"[T]he incentive for a class member to file a claim form is low." Id. ATTM cites studies
that show class members rarely receive more than pennies on the dollar for their claims...
" Id. "Plaintiffs do not dispute these statistics .. . ." Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11.
"The new arbitration provision 'allows both customers and ATTM to win: Customers'
claims are resolved quickly and fully, and ATTM achieves significant savings on transac-
tion costs . .. while retaining good relations with its customers." Id. at *12. "The Court
agrees." Id. "The record before the Court demonstrates that a reasonable consumer may
well prefer quick informal resolution with likely full payment over class litigation that
could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a
claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars." Id.
223. Id. at *2.
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means required.224 The agreement compelled AT&T to assume
considerable financial responsibility for arbitration.22" The com-
pany had to shoulder all arbitration costs, and the agreement pro-
hibited AT&T from seeking attorney's fees and other expenses-
even upon prevailing.26 Further, the arbitrator could award puni-
tive damages.227 If the arbitrator awarded damages to the con-
sumer that were greater than AT&T's last settlement offer, AT&T
was required to pay the consumer a minimum of $7,500, in addi-
tion to twice the customer's attorney's fees. 22' The parties' agree-
ment also provided for arbitration that was very convenient for
the consumer-proceedings had to take place in the county of the
customer's billing address. 2 9  For claims of less than $10,000,
AT&T customers could choose whether the arbitration took place
in person, or via telephone or document submission.23 °
While not discussed in AT&T Mobility, the underlying purpose
of contract law is to make the non-breaching party whole-to place
the non-breaching party in the position it would have occupied
had the contract been performed correctly.231  Were the
Concepcions to enter bilateral arbitration for $30.22 in actual
damages, the amount of their potential recovery in arbitration
would be exponentially larger, thus rendering the Concepcions not
only whole, but in a significantly better position than they would
have occupied had they not lost $30.22 via an allegedly improper
tax.
Taking into consideration the terms of the bilateral arbitration
provision as stipulated in the parties' agreement, the Concepcions
would have been better off via their bilateral arbitration agree-
ment than as members of a class. Therefore, the class arbitration
waiver was not disproportionately favorable to AT&T, and the









231. MURRAY, supra note 128, at 12 (quoting MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp.,
171 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)).
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B. Discover Bank-Unconscionability Per Se?
It follows that the Discover Bank rule, which would have ren-
dered unconscionable the AT&T-Concepcion arbitration agree-
ment, is unacceptably broad in its application. Justice Scalia rec-
ognized that while the Discover Bank rule does not mandate the
availability of class arbitration, it mandates that a party to a con-
sumer contract of adhesion may demand it.232 Nowadays consum-
er contracts are overwhelmingly contracts of adhesion,233 and Jus-
tice Scalia correctly observed that the required accompanying cir-
cumstances of small damages and a disfavored party's allegation
of fraud, with no requirement of proof, are at best vague nullities
and dangerously broad in scope.234 Thus, the California Supreme
Court's determination that such contracts are unconscionable is
dangerously close to a determination that such arbitration clauses
are unconscionable per se-a direct contravention of the FAA's
mandate that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except on general state-law grounds to revoke a con-
tract.235 Arbitration agreements cannot be invalidated by defenses
that are exclusively focused on the mechanism of class arbitra-
tion,236 of which the Discover Bank rule is a paradigm.237
C. What's "Leff" to Discuss?
Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Discover Bank rule fails as a
§ 2 grounds for revocation forestalls his discussion of the parties'
arbitration agreement pursuant to California unconscionability
law. However, it is important to note that if the Concepcions'
unconscionability argument made it past the § 2 savings clause of
the FAA, their class arbitration waiver would not have been
deemed unconscionable. Under California law, and pursuant to
the unconscionability analysis developed by Professor Arthur Leff,
an unconscionability finding requires the ingredients of both pro-
232. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
233. Id. See also Murray, supra note 216, at 11 (discussing the pervasiveness of arbitra-
tion clauses in telephone, television, Internet, medical insurance, and mortgage loan
agreements).
234. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
235. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
236. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
237. See also Faber v. Menard, 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a court
cannot conclude that an arbitration clause is unconscionable solely because it is an adhe-
sion contract).
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cedural and substantive unconscionability.238  These ingredients
are analyzed on a sliding scale.2 3 9 A contract of adhesion is, as
characterized by Professor John E. Murray, Jr., "the paradigm of
procedural unconscionability." 24 °  Thus, the procedural
unconscionability element in the parties' agreement is easily met,
because it is a contract of adhesion. However, nowadays an
agreement's quality of adhesion is analyzed merely as one factor of
many in an unconscionability analysis, given the extraordinary
prevalence of adhesion contracts in the consumer industry.24'
As to the presence of substantive unconscionability in the
AT&T-Concepcion agreement, the class arbitration waiver is the
sole provision circumscribing the Concepcions' acts.242 Otherwise,
as discussed supra, the Concepcions can pursue their claim via
small-claims court or bilateral arbitration that is free of charge,
exceedingly convenient, and with the potential for an award that
is nearly 250 times what the Concepcions originally claimed.243
Taking these factors into account, the parties' arbitration agree-
ment hardly demonstrates contract terms that are unreasonably
favorable to AT&T, as would be required for a finding of substan-
tive unconscionability in the parties' agreement.2"
D. Did the Concepcions Assume the Risk of a Class Arbitration
Waiver?
Professor Murray finds the procedural versus substantive
unconscionability analysis "devoid of analytical value."245 The
terms "procedural unconscionability" and "substantive
unconscionability" are merely legal conclusions that provide only
"the delusion of an analytical construct."246 Professor Murray pro-
238. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). See also CAL. Civ. CODE §
1670.5 (West 2011) (mandating that a contract or clause therein is unenforceable if it was
unconscionable at the time it was made); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
239. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148.
240. Murray, supra note 216, at 7-8.
241. MURRAY, supra note 128, at 470 (citation omitted).
242. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2008) (internal citation omitted).
243. As discussed supra, if the arbitrator awarded damages to the consumer that were
greater than AT&T's last settlement offer, AT&T was required to pay the consumer a min-
imum of $7,500, in addition to twice the customer's attorney's fees, despite the fact that the
Concepcions claimed only $30.22 in damages. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2.
244. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).




poses247 an alternative unconscionability analysis-one that courts
can execute via a three-step analysis focusing on the principle of
assumption of risk.2 48 At the core of this analysis is the question of
whether a reasonable person in the position of the disfavored par-
ty would have been aware of a particular risk when entering into
the agreement.24 9
First,2 50 the court must determine whether the risk was ex-
pected, or at the very least not unexpected,25 ' based on the parties'
expression of intent or on the surrounding circumstances-such as
"trade usage, prior course of dealing, or course of performance."252
If the risk is unexpected, the risk cannot be allocated when the
facts indicate that a reasonable man would not assume the risk.253
However, if the clause is conspicuous, a reasonable disfavored par-
ty is more likely to see it, and therefore, assent to it.
254
The AT&T-Concepcion agreement was a one-page document
with terms primarily in small font.2 5 AT&T brought attention to
the start of the arbitration clause by placing the word
"ARBITRATION" in bold capital letters, followed by a sentence
advising the AT&T consumer to "read this paragraph carefully."
2 6
A reasonable consumer would see this conspicuous clause, and
therefore, have the opportunity to assent to it, as the Concepcions
did by accepting their initial wireless service and renewing that
service in May 2003, February 2005, and again in May 2006-two
months after having filed their complaint in federal court.257
247. Murray, supra note 122. Professor Murray clarifies that his suggested analysis:
[I]s not a panacea; it does not automatically answer every question posed in the
unconscionability area. As the analysis itself suggests, there is no rote formula,
which can accomplish such a feat. The analysis is but an effort to help courts focus
upon the important questions to be decided under the heading of unconscionability.
Id. at 34.
248. Id. at 13-30 (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 605 (1963)).
249. Id. at 13-14.
250. Id. at 14. The unique fact situation determines which step of the analysis is best
pursued first. Id.
251. Id. Or alternatively, whether it was not unexpected for one of the parties to assume
a certain risk. Id.
252. Murray, supra note 122, at 14.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 19. It must be noted that conspicuousness is merely evidence of assent-that
a reasonable person in the position of the consumer would likely know that the risk altera-
tion was included in the contract. Id.
255. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2008).
256. Id. at *2.
257. Id.
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With such assent to an expected risk, the second step is for the
court to determine whether the disfavored party's manifestation of
assent, in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, was a genu-
ine exercise of free will."'8 If not, then the clause containing the
allocated risk is unconscionable.259 With an adhesion contract, the
characteristics to be weighed in considering the degree of exer-
cised free will are, inter alia, the importance the subject has for
the physical and economical well-being of the disfavored party, the
parties' bargaining power, and the degree to which the disfavored
party may seek out other sources for the contracted good or ser-
vice.26 °
The Concepcions' use of their AT&T cell phones, albeit conven-
ient, was hardly important for their physical and economical well-
being. While the Concepcions had no bargaining power in the
AT&T-Concepcion consumer adhesion contract, the Concepcions
repeatedly renewed their AT&T contract with the conspicuous
class arbitration waiver---even after filing a complaint against the
company-instead of seeking out other means of acquiring cellular
telephone service. The Concepcions clearly exercised genuine
free will in choosing to remain AT&T customers.
If after the first step of the assumption-of-risk analysis, the
court were to determine that the risk allocation was unexpected,
the court would take the second step of determining whether the
unexpected risk was material.262 A clause is not unconscionable if
a party to whom an unexpected risk is allocated is not any worse
off after that allocation. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
241 lists five guideline factors to be used in determining the mate-
riality of a breach of contract.263 The first factor is most applicable
258. Murray, supra note 122, at 28. "If the risk alteration process is effective, there is
apparent assent and only... verification of assent[] remains." Id. at 33.
259. Id. at 28-29. This is also true in the case of an unexpected, reallocated, material
risk, discussed supra note 253.
260. Id. at 29 (quoting O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545,
550 (Ili. 1958)). Note that the court must look at these factors in the complete context of
the factual scenario. Id.
261. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2.
262. Murray, supra note 122, at 23-24.
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979). The five factors are:
[(1)] the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected; [(2)] the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of the benefit of which he will be deprived; [(3)] the extent
to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; [(4)]
the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
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to the doctrine of unconscionability: "the extent to which the in-
jured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably
expected. "
26 4
Even if the court were to determine that the class arbitration
waiver in the AT&T-Concepcion agreement was unexpected, the
Concepcions would not be deprived of the benefit they reasonably
expected via class arbitration-a full, prompt, and efficient com-
pensation of their claim through an assertion of their substantive
rights. As discussed supra, the district court acknowledged that
the Concepcions likely would have been fully and promptly com-
pensated via their bilateral arbitration agreement with AT&T. At
the conclusion of this three-step assumption-of-risk analysis, it is
evident that the Concepcions were reasonably aware of the class
arbitration waiver from the conspicuous language of the contract
and therefore assumed its risk. Thus, the class arbitration waiver
in the Concepcion-AT&T agreement is not unconscionable.
E. What the Future Holds
The majority in AT&T Mobility held that the FAA preempts a
state law recognizing as unconscionable a class arbitration waiver
in a consumer adhesion contract wherein claims will likely involve
small damages, and the party of inferior bargaining power has
alleged fraud.26 Although an arbitration clause without AT&T's
recovery premiums or double attorney's fees may still be deemed
unconscionable, the Supreme Court's continued broad construction
of the FAA is of some concern, as this trend has the potential to
undermine the enforceability of the States' common law. Arbitra-
tion awards are not legal precedent-substantive law does not
bind the arbitrators, and arbitration awards often contradict
common law.266
Under § 10 of the FAA, an error of law is not a sufficient basis
for vacating an award.267 Rather, the parties themselves deter-
mine the significance that substantive law plays in the arbitration
process. A considerable threshold must be met in order to vacate
an arbitration award. Section 10 mandates that an arbitration
[(5)] the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to per-
form comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.
264. Id.
265. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011).
266. See Murray, supra note 216, at 18.
267. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
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award can only be vacated if it was made via corruption, fraud,
the arbitrators' explicit partiality, or if the arbitrators exceeded
their power under the FAA.26 There is a considerable amount of
judicial action on the issue of the unconscionability of certain arbi-
tration clauses, and it remains to be seen where the Supreme
Court will draw the line in its consistent enforcement of the mech-
anism, so as to preserve the integrity of our common law.
Ginevra Ventre
268. Id.
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